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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Wagner asks the Idaho Court of Appeals to withdraw its opinion, 2015
Unpublished Opinion No. 391 (Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2015) (hereinafter, Opinion), and rehear
this case. He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the order summarily dismissing
his petition for post conviction relief, was based on a rationale that had not been
presented to or decided by the district court.

As a result, the decision to affirm the

summary dismissal on that basis violated the notice requirements in the post conviction
statutes, and thus, the due process protections of the state and federal constitutions.
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Supreme

Entered on ATS by

Therefore, this Court should rehear this case and decide whether summary
dismissal was appropriate based on the issues of which Mr. \J\/agner had the requisite
notice and the opportunity to address in the district court.

On rehearing, this Court

should reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition, vacate the judgment in this
case, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing because Mr. Wagner did present
sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedin s
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Wagner pied guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of lewd conduct, and in exchange, the State dismissed two
other counts, as well as the Information Part II alleging a prior sexually-based
conviction, and the State also agreed to recommend a unified sentence of thirty years,
with ten years fixed. (R., p.65; Supp. R., pp.77-79; Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.12-20.) 1 Prior to
the entry of this plea, the State had filed a motion to introduce evidence of Mr. Wagner's
previous convictions as evidence of a common plan or scheme pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b) at trial. (Supp. R., pp.56-60; see also R., pp.65-66; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.15 - p.7,
L.20.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of thirty years, with eight

The district court took judicial notice of "the entire underlying criminal file" from the
underlying criminal case. (R., p.52.) That documents from that file were provided in
independently bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, reference to the
record or transcripts from that file will be identified as "Supp." Additionally, the
transcripts from hearings in the post conviction case are contained in two independently
bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume
containing the transcript of the status conference held on June 17, 2013. "Vol.2" will
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion for
summary dismissal held on July 17, 2013.
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years fixed.

(R., p.66.) Mr. Wagner did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

(R., p.5.)
However, Mr. Wagner did file a timely pro se petition for post conviction relief,
alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel had "failed to argue to keep his prior record out
of court records." (R., pp.5-6.) The district court appointed counsel, who clarified that
this was a claim alleging that Mr. Wagner's guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary because trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., p.57.) Specifically, post conviction counsel clarified that the ineffective assistance
was that trial counsel inaccurately told Mr. Wogner that he would lose at trial because of
his prior record, and, if he went to trial, he would be sentenced to life in prison. Based
on those assertions by counsel, Mr. Wagner pied guilty despite believing in his factual
innocence. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.20; R., pp.73-74.)
The State filed an answer denying Mr. Wagner's allegations. (R., pp.26-28.) It
also moved for summary dismissal of this claim because "[t]he defendant's prior criminal
history is always relevant at sentencing and it is not for counsel of record to try and
'keep it out."' (R., pp.34-35.) It renewed that motion after counsel had been appointed
to represent Mr. Wagner. (R., pp.41, 47-48.) The State's motion was discussed during
two subsequent hearings.

(See generally Tr., Vols.1-2.) The State did not add any

other arguments in support of its request for summary judgment in either its renewed
motion or at the hearings. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol.1, p.6, Ls.18-21.) The district court took
the arguments under advisement and subsequently filed a notice of intent to summarily
dismiss the petition. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.20; R., pp.65-72.)
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The district court decided that summary dismissal was appropriate because the
answers Mr. Wagner gave during the plea colloquy and in the guilty pica questionnaire
were evidence which disproved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., pp.69-70.) The district court stated, "[s]ince this Court is the trier of fact, it is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
disposition; rather, it is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidence."

(R., p.7·1.)

Based on this reasoning, it considered

Mr. Wagner's claims in light of his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire.
(R., pp.69-70.)

For example, "[h]is assertion now that he was 'factually innocent' is

directly contradicted by the record."

(R., p.70.)

In reaching those conclusions, the

district court essentially weighed the evidence presented in Mr. Wagner's affidavit
against the evidence presented in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire, and made
a credibility determination in favor of Mr. Wagner's statements in the plea colloquy.

(See R., pp.69-71.)

The district court also determined that Mr. Wagner had not

presented a valid claim for relief in regard to counsel's advice about his prior record
because "it is neither a trial counsel's obligation nor counsel's responsibility to hide a
prior record from a sentencing court." (R., p.69.)
In response to the notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Wagner filed an affidavit in
which he alleged that counsel had told him that, if he did not answer the questions in the
plea colloquy and on the guilty plea questionnaire "correctly," the district court would not
accept his guilty plea, although he did note that his trial attorney did not advise him to lie
in his responses. (R., p.74.)
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t'Jevertheless, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Wagner's petition
because it was based on "bare and conclusory statements that were addressed in the
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
evidence to support his allegations."

The petitioner has failed to introduce any new
(R., pp.76-77; R., p.86.)

Mr. Wagner timely

appealed from that decision. (R., pp. 78-79.)
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which issued an unpublished
opinion affirming the order summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post
conviction release.

Wagner v. State, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 391 (Ct. App.

Mar. 4, 2015). The Court of Appeals noted that a petition for post conviction relief could
be dismissed if the petition did not show that "'a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances."'
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).

Id., at p.6 (quoting Padilla v.

Given that observation, the Court of Appeals

determined that Mr. Wagner had failed to show prejudice as required by Padilla
because "[t]aking all of these facts into consideration and balancing them against the
evidence presented by [Mr.] Wagner--[Mr.] Wagner's contention that he would have
asked to go to trial but for defense counsel's deficient performance--we are not
persuaded that rejecting the plea bargain he ultimately accepted would have been
rational under the circumstances." Id. at p. 7 (emphasis from original). As a result, the
Court of Appeals held: "[Mr.] Wagner did not make a prima facie showing of prejudice,
and because there was no genuine issue of material fact, the State was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court
summarily dismissing [Mr.] Wagner's petition for post-conviction relief." Id.
Mr. Wagner filed a timely petition for rehearing.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the lclaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirmed the district court's order
summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post conviction relief on a basis
for which Mr. Wagner did not have notice or an opportunity to respond.

2.

Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition
for post conviction relief even though he presented evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

inion Affirmed The District Court's Order Summarily
Dismissing Mr. Wagner's Petition For Post Conviction fselief On A Basis For Which
Mr. Wa ner Did Not Have Notice Or An O ortunit To Res ond
The statutes governing post conviction proceedings allow for summary dismissal
of a petition for relief only if it does not present a genuine issue of material fact.
I.C. § 19-4906(b ). However, that statute also provides that:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction
relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its
reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to
reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or
on default thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant
leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings
otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper
if there exists a material issue of fact.

Id. (emphasis added). As a result, "[a) petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial court's
contemplated grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to respond before a petition for
post-conviction relief is dismissed. Failure to provide such notice and opportunity to be
heard may result in reversal of a summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief."

Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b));

cf. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). The reason that reversal of the
order summarily dismissing the petition is the proper remedy is that the failure to
provide notice and the opportunity to be heard constitutes a violation of the
constitutional rights to due process. See U.S. CONST. amend.XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 13.
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Notice may be provided by the State in a motion for summarily dismissal or by
the district court in a notice of intent to dismiss. See Workman v. State, 144 !daho 518,
524 (2007) In either case, that notice must be sufficiently particular as to the basis for
summary dismissal, both in terms of the facts and legal analysis, "so as to enable the
applicant to supplement the application with the necessary additional facts, if they exist."
Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, 494 (Ct. App. 2006).

In this case, the State filed a motion to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's petition
for post conviction relief, which it renewed after Mr. Wagner was appointed post
conviction counsel. (R., pp.29-36, 4 7-48.) Hearings were held at which time the State's
motion was discussed.

(See generally Tr., Vols.1-2.) All the State argued was that

summary judgment was appropriate because Mr. Wagner's claims were disproved by
the record or additional evidence submitted by the State (namely, an affidavit from trial
counsel).

(R., pp.34-36.)

The district court also issued its own notice of intent to

dismiss. (R., pp.64-72.) In that notice, the district court only determined that summary
judgment was appropriate because Mr. Wagner's claims of deficient performance were
either disproved by the record or consisted of only bare and conclusory allegations.
(R., pp.68-71.)
At no time during those proceedings was Mr. Wagner informed that his petition
could be summarily dismissed because his verified allegation of prejudice was
insufficient for the specific reason he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that
it would have been rational for him to reject the plea agreement, nor was he given the
opportunity to develop the record to disprove such an assertion.

(See generally

R., pp.29-36, 47-48, 64-72; Tr. Vols.1-2.) As such, the decision to affirm the summary

8

judgment on that basis violates the notice requirernent because Mr. Wagner was not
informed of the specific legal analysis or facts upon which the summary judgment vvas
validated, nor was he given the meaningful opportunity to respond to that legal analysis
and those facts.
Furthermore; the appeal is not the appropriate venue to resolve this issue. As
has long been the case, "[n]ew issues cannot be framed in this court, nor can new or
additional evidence be presented on appeal." Morrow v. Wm. Berklund Forest Products
Co., 8"1 Idaho 428, 443 (1959) (opinion of the Court on the respondent's petition for
rehearing). Resolution of such issues "must await an appropriate setting wherein the
issues are framed, the facts disclosed and supported by the record, and all parties
protected in their right to litigate tile question." Saviors v. Richey, 96 Idaho 413, 417
(197 4 ). Thus, this nevv issue is not appropriately decided on appeal; rather, the case
should be remanded and the issue first addressed by the district court after the parties
are able to fully litigate the issue.
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to rule on an issue not raised in the
district court when reviewing a decision to summarily dismissed a petition for post
conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 730-31 (2008). Specifically, the Court
held:
If we relied upon the affidavit to hold that the district court erred, we would
be deciding the appeal on an issue not raised or argued by Pizzuto. See,
Sprinkler Irr. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d
667 (2004) (where the plaintiff did not argue to the trial court that its
verified complaint provided sufficient material facts to counter the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, this Court would not consider
that argument on appeal).

Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 730-31.
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While Pizzuto was applying this rule against the petitioner for failing to argue tl1e
issue below, the same rule should be applied when the State does not argue, or the
district court does not rule on a particular issue. Enforcing disparate procedural rules
1

between the accused and State violates the protections of tt1e Due Process Clause.

See, e.g. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 n.6 (1973) ("This Court has therefore
1

been particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to
the State when the !ack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a
fair trial."). In this case, forcing defendant-petitioners to raise issues before the district
court, but allowing the State to argue issues not preserved for appeal, or worse,
allowing the appellate court to decide a factual issue sua sponte without any argument
from either party, allows for nonreciprocal benefits to the State that interferes with the
defendant-petitioner's ability to secure a fair review of alleged errors in the trial court
proceedings.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's determination - that it was "not persuaded
that rejecting the plea bargain he ultimately accepted would have been rational under
the circumstances."

Opinion, p.7 (emphasis from original) - constitutes an improper

weighing of the evidence during summary dismissal proceedings. See, e.g., Vanderford

Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 67 4 (2011) ("judging credibility is not appropriate
during summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held.");

Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 419 (2012) (quoting
Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984 )) ("credibility determinations
'should not be made on summary judgment . . . . "').

This is particularly true at the

appellate level because, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held:
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In determining whether substantial evidence exists, this Court may not
weigh the evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of witnesses, or
compare its factual findings with those of the jury. Instead, this Court must
review the evidence as a whole, drawing all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and viewing the facts as if the
moving party had admitted the truth of all the non-moving party's
evidence. The Court will not examine any conflicting evidence presented
by the moving party to refute the non-moving party's claims. Whether
there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury is a
pure question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 136-37 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

Rather, if there are such questions, "[b]ecause appellate

review on this issue is more limited, we remand to the district court to weigh the
evidence in the first instance .... " Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., ·111 Idaho 594,
610 ('1986) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the weighing of tt1e
reasonableness of Mr. \f\/8gner's assertion that he would not have pied guilty is not an
appropriate part of the appellate review.
Applying the limited standard of review in this case, liberally construing facts in
favor of Mr. Wagner, shows there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Wagner would not
have pied guilty at the time he did so, and that is enough to establish a genuine issue of
material fact on the issue of prejudice. See Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011)
(to sufficiently allege prejudice so as to withstand a claim for summary judgment, the
petitioner need only show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.")
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Construing all the facts in Mr. Wagner's
favor, it is reasonable that he would not have plead guilty so that he could pursue a
challenge to the State's notice of intent to present evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b).
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After all, the question is not whether Mr. Wagner would stiil ultimately have
sought trial.

See Booth, 15·1 Idaho at 621.

Rather, the question is whether, had

counsel performed sufficiently and challenged the inappropriate propensity evidence
under I.R.E. 404(b), would Mr. Wagner have accepted this plea offer at the time he did
so? As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, a genuine issue of fact may exist "as to
whether a motion to suppress would have been successful and, therefore, whether
counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a motion." Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho
898, 906 (Ct. App. 20·12) (discussing Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 480 (Ct. App. 2008)).
Thus, the issue in this case is whether it would have been reasonable for Mr. Wagner to
reject the plea offer on the table so that counsel could raise a viable pretrial challenge to
the State's proposed use of improper propensity evidence.

That would have been a

reasonable decision for Mr. Wagner to make.
As such, even if this issue is properly resolved on appeal, it should have been
resolved in Mr. Wagner's favor. His verified affidavit presented a reasonable probability
that he would have rationally rejected the plea offer and demanded to continue toward
trial, and thus, presented a genuine issue of material fact that counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced him.
Therefore, this Court should withdraw the Opinion in this case since that opinion
was based on an issue which was not raised before the district court and Mr. Wagner
was not given the required notice and opportunity to respond to that potential ground for
summary dismissal.

12

IL
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissin J Mr. Wagner's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine
Issue Of Material Fact
A.

Introduction
As to the rationales for summary dismissal for which Mr. Wagner did have notice

and the opportunity to be heard, summary dismissal was inappropriate on those
grounds, as Mr. Wagner presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is
required

to

accept

the

petitioner's

unrebutted

allegations

as

true

.

. . ." 2

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho ·148, 153 (2007); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,
321 (1995).

Additionally, during the summary judgment phase, the courts ''liberally

construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." 3

Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) ("[l]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the
petitioner."). When a genuine issue of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the
petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner for relief, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing.

Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518

(1998).

2

Where, as in this case, the State files an answer that denies the allegations in the
verified petition (R., pp.26-28), those denials do not affirmatively disprove the
allegations. Rather, they only create genuine issues of material fact in regard to those
issues, specifically, whether or not the petitioner's allegations are factually accurate.
Because a genuine issue of material fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is
inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153.
3 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.29-36.) Therefore, the facts and
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Wagner's favor. Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881.
13

To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's
petiormance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by
that deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ('1984 );

McKeeth v. State, ·140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004).

In regard to the second prong of the

Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words,
he must undermine confidence in the outcome.

McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010).

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

In cases where, as here, the petitioner

alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to accept a plea offer, he must
show "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'

Booth, ·151 Idaho at 621

(quoting Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))).
This means that he has to show a reasonable probability that he would have rejected
this plea offer to purse a trial, which would include pretrial motions in limine (such as a
challenge to a notice of intent to present evidence pursuant to 1.R.E. 404(b)).
Furthermore, in order to be a valid guilty plea, the plea must be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.

!.C.R. 11; see, e.g., State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97

(2007) ("Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver is not met."). If a defendant enters a plea without adequate knowledge
of the potential penalties to which his plea will subject him, it is not a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary plea. State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859-60 (Ct. App. 2007).
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B.

Mr. Wa ner Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attome
Was Ineffective For Not ChallenginJ The Admissibilit Of His Prior Record At
Trial

·L

Mr. Wa ner's Claim That His Trial Attorne Was Ineffective For Not
Challenging The Admissibilit{ Of His Prior Record At Trial Was Not
Waived By Post Conviction Counsel

In the initial appellate briefing in this case, the State contended that this Court
cannot consider Mr. Wagner's claim

that his attorney was ineffective for not fighting

against the State's request to present the facts underlying two prior convictions at trial because post conviction counsel purportedly waived the claim below. (Resp. Br., pp.1011.)

The Opinion notes that "It is not apparent from the record that [Mr.] Wagner

actually waived lhe ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the plea
bargaining process.

Moreover, the district court did not treat the claim as waived; it

addressed the merits in its notice of intent to dismiss." Opinion, p.5 n.4. However, the
Court of Appeals did not actually decide that issue, as it found the merits of the claim
dispositive. Id.
Post conviction counsel did not waive this issue below.

Rather, he was

explaining that there were several different ways that the claim, as articulated in
Mr. Wagner's pro se petition, could be interpreted. As such, post conviction counsel
was directing the district court to the proper interpretation of the claim Mr. Wagner
wanted to pursue and only conceding that the alternate interpretations did not constitute
bases for relief. Post conviction counsel did not concede the argument that Mr. Wagner
intended to pursue. In fact, he reiterated the request for an evidentiary hearing on that
claim in his brief and at the summary disposition hearing.

15

(R., p.57; Tr., Vol.2, p.7,

Ls.15-20.)

The fact that post conviction counsel continued to request an evidentiary

hearing on this ciaim affirmatively demonstrates that he was not conceding the issue.
To that point, post conviction counsel noted in his memorandum in support of
Mr. Wagner's petition that "Petitioner's pleading [on this issue] is confusing." (R., p.56.)
In his prose petition, Mr. Wagner claimed, "Counsel did not fight to keep ·13 [year] o!d
evidence out of court. ... Counsel failed to argue to keep prior record out of court
records." (R., pp.5-6.) In the affidavit accompanying the pro se petition, Mr. Wagner
added, "My attorney ... did not argue to keep a 13 year old felony conviction from being
used against me. Further he allowed the prosecuting attorney to rely solely upon my
criminal record for a conviction rather than any evidence in the present case." (R., p.9.)
Because the thrust of Mr. Wagner's claim was unclear, post conviction counsel sought
to clarify the claim.
As such, post conviction counsel explained that the claim Mr. Wagner intended to
pursue was that he "was led to believe his history would be admitted at trial, the jury
would convict him because of his [criminal] history, and he would suffer a far worse fate
than what was contemplated by the plea agreement.

The Petitioner pied this in his

petition as: Trial Counsel having failed to keep the information 'out' as he should have."
(R., p.56.)

Post conviction counsel maintained, "Petitioner asks this court to deny

the State's request to dismiss and allow the matter to go to evidentiary hearing."
(R., pp.56-57.)
Post conviction counsel provided an additional explanation of his clarification of
the issue at the summary dismissal hearing:

16

With regard to the prior history -- the prior history from the state of
New York,[4] I explained to my client that it probably wouldn't come in
in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached
to be a common scheme or plan.
I certainly conceded in my memorandum that the Court absolutely
would consider that type of information at sentencing. It's absolutely
appropriate for the court to consider at sentencing. And I'm certain that
[the prosecutor] would have and did both highlight his criminal history as
an aggravating feature at sentencing in this particular case.
But I think the way I explained it in terms of interpreting the pro se
petition that's been filed before Your Honor was that (trial counsel] said
that you [Mr. Wagner] would be facing a much worse outcome and that
you can't take the case to trial because of your prior history. And I think
what my client heard was: I won't [take] the case to trial, and you need to
plead guilty and accept this offer.
At least that's the way he has explained it to me. I realize that, in
and of itself isn't grounds for ineffective assistance of counsei. But that's
certainly the way Mr. Wagner would want anyone reading his affidavit and
petition to appreciate the nature of the allegation that he's making.
I also brought up the issue of voluntariness, intelligence, and
knowing making a plea. I think Mr. Wagner believes he was duped into
pleading guilty, and he would want this Court to deny the State's request
to dismiss and allow him to proceed to an evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L:15 - p.7, L.20.) As such, post conviction counsel framed the argument
Mr. Wagner was pursuing as an allegation that the prior history would not have been
admissible at trial and trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that point. (R., p.56.)
Post conviction counsel also argued that there was a basis for trial counsel to have
made that argument: "I explained to my client that [the prior record] probably wouldn't
come in in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached to be
a common scheme or plan." (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-19.) On that claim, post conviction
counsel maintained that Mr. Wagner should receive an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.57;
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.)

4

Only one of the prior convictions was from New York; the second was from Virginia.
(See, e.g., R., pp.65-66.)
17

Looking at post conviction counsel's entire argument, it becomes clear that post
conviction counsel's concessions only re!ate to potential interpretations of tho claim
that Mr. Wagner was not, in fact, pursuing.

For example, post conviction counsel

explained that Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not
keeping the prior convictions out of the sentencing proceedings. (R., p.56; Tr., Vol.2,
p.6, Ls.20-23.) In fact, Mr. Wagner alleged as much in the affidavit he filed after the
district court issued its notice of intent to summarily dismiss his petition: "2. My Trial
Counsel told me my prior record would cause me to lose at jury trial. 3. I only plead
[sic] guilty because Trial Counsel told me I would lose at jury trial. ... 6. I would have
asked the case be tried to a jury, but Trial Counsel advised me I would lose because of
my prior record." (R., pp. 73-74.) Therefore, he "conceded" the prior convictions were
appropriately considered during the sentencing phase of the proceedings. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.6, Ls.20-22.) Similarly, post conviction counsel explained that Mr. Wagner was not
arguing that trial counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying that he would not try the
case, since post conviction counsel believed that such a claim would not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 (Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.2-11.)

5

Post conviction counsel was mistaken in that assertion. The defendant has the right to
decide whether or not to take a case to trial. See, e.g., State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963,
965-66 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial counsel cannot waive the right to a trial, the
defendant must do that personally). Certainly, counsel may offer advice in that regard,
but ultimately, the decision belongs to the defendant. See id. Therefore, trial counsel's
refusal to try to the case despite the defendant's wishes would constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, as the State points out, post conviction counsel
conceded that particular argument - that counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying he
would not try the case. Therefore, were Mr. Wagner attempting to pursue that particular
claim on appeal, the State's argument would be well taken. But since Mr. Wagner is not
pursuing that particular claim, the State's argument - that this Court cannot consider the
merits of Mr. Wagner's claim because post conviction counsel conceded the point - is
mistaken.
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On appeal, Mr. Wagner continues to pursue the issue post conviction counsel
raised:

his trial attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable because trial

counsel did not fight to keep Mr. Wagner's criminal record from being declared
admissible at trial, even though Idaho Supreme Court precedent on point reveals that
he would have been successful. Since that argument was never waived, it is properly
raised on appeal. As such, this Court should consider the merits of that claim.

2.

Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Admissibility Of Mr. Wagner's Prior
Record For Trial Purposes Was Objectively Unreasonable And Prejudicial

Mr. Wagner contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
because his counsel provided him with erroneous information during the plea bargaining
process. For example, according to Mr. Wagner's affidavit, "[m]y Trial Counsel told me
my prior criminal record would cause me to lose at trial." 6 (R., p. 73.) That advice was
objectively unreasonable since the Idaho Supreme Court has limited the scope of
common scheme or plan evidence to only those cases where "the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other."

State v.

Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009) (emphasis from original) (quoting

State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 750-51 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
State

v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )). 7 This means that there must be "'evidence of a

6

The record supports Mr. Wagner's allegation in this regard, as it demonstrates that his
concern - that his prior record could be introduced as evidence at trial - was legitimate.
The State had filed a motion to allow them to present that evidence to the jury under
I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. (Supp. R., pp.56-60.)
Therefore, Mr. Wagner's allegation - that trial counsel told him this evidence would
cause him to lose at trial - is an assertion that trial counsel told Mr. Wagner that his
~rior record would be admitted at trial.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Grist on this point. State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 9 (2013).
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comrnon scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that' the defendant has committed

the same kind of misconduct in the past."

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013)

(quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010)) (emphasis added).
This means that, "at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or
plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the
past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Johnson, for
example, that the fact that the victims were similar in age, the defendant had a similar
relationship to the victims, and the touching was similar in nature was not sufficient to
establish that the evidence was relevant to some non-propensity purpose. Id. at 669.
This case is indistinguishable from Johnson in that regard. The evidence from
Mr. Wagner's prior criminal record that the State sought to admit was that Mr. Wagner
had similar contact with an unrelated victim fourteen years previous in a different state.
(Supp. R., pp.57-58.)

Furthermore, as the State pointed out in the initial appellate

briefing, Mr. Wagner's prior convictions dealt with acts that "appeared to be an
almost impulsive manner."

(Resp. Br., p.12; see also Resp. Br., p.12 (referring to

"[Mr.] Wagner's previous conviction for impulsively molesting [a child]").)

When a

person acts impulsively, they are acting on "[a] sudden urge or inclination that prompts

an unplanned action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 344 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (emphasis
added). Thus, impulsive actions are, by definition, not part of some preconceived plan
or scheme.

See id.

As a result, the only thing relating those prior incidents to the

present offense is the bare fact that Mr. Wagner had committed the same kind of
misconduct in the past.

That fact is not sufficient to make the prior convictions

admissible under I.RE. 404(b). See, e.g., Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669.
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As such, the two events were not related to each other in a way that the proof of
one would tend to establish the other, and so, it is precisely the type of propensity
evidence that the Idaho Supreme Court had held to be inadmissible in Grist and Joy.
Therefore, counsel's advice

that Mr. Wagner should take the plea because he would

lose at trial based on the evidence of his past record - was objectively unreasonable;
Mr. Wagner's prior record was not admissible at trial.
Nevertheless, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Wagner's claim in this
regard.

It did so because it determined that Mr. Wagner's prior record was

appropriately admitted before the sentencing judge. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.1; R.,
p.69.) However, that analysis is irrelevant to Mr. Wagner's complaint regarding what
trial counsel told him he could expect "at trial." (R., p.73 (emphasis added). Therefore,
the district court's conclusions about the propriety of admitting Mr. Wagner's prior record
at sentencing is irrelevant to the issue Mr. Wagner presented in his petition. As such,

the district court's rationale does not justify its decision to summarily dismiss Mr.
Wagner's petition. Therefore, Mr. Wagner presented sufficient facts to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel's advice in this regard fell below a
reasonable standard of performance.

C.

Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attorney
Made An Erroneous Assertion Regarding The Sentence He Would Receive If He
Did Not Plead Guilty
Mr. Wagner also contended that he was not adequately informed about the

potential punishments during his consideration of whether to accept the plea deal.
Specifically, he alleged that "Trial Counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison
if I lost at trial." (R., p. 73.) As that statement appears in a verified affidavit and is an
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assertion of fact within Mr. Wagner's personal knowledge, it is evidence which the
district court was required to consider in its summary dismissal calculus.

See, e.g.,

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2007).

In Baldwin, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, "Baldwin presents his own
affidavit describing his version of the interaction [in question]. Baldwin's affidavit sets

fotih facts that would be admissible at trial.

Thus, because Baldwin's Petition and

Affidavit present facts that would entitle Baldwin to relief, if he were able to prove them
at a hearing, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition."

Id.

(emphasis added). Like the petitioner in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner alleged facts in his own
affidavit that demonstrated his attorney performed deficiently.

Therefore, just as in

Baldwin, because Mr. Wagner's petition and affidavit present admissible facts that

would entitle him to relief, if he were able to prove them at a hearing, the district court
erred when it summarily dismissed the petition.
Additionally, while a life sentence may have been a potential penalty with the
sentencing enhancement still on the table (see Supp. R., pp.51-52 (the State's motion
for leave to file information, part 11, based on Mr. Wagner's prior record)), a life sentence
was not required (certainly, a fixed life sentence was not required). (See, e.g., Supp.
Tr., p.10, Ls.18-20 (the district court informing Mr. Wagner that the "maximum possible
penalty" was life in prison) (emphasis added).) As such, counsel's representation that
Mr. Wagner "would be sentenced to life in prison" was erroneous. (R., p.73 (emphasis
added).) At the summary dismissal stage, the district court is required to construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
793 (2004) (quoting Saykahmchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995)). Applying that
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rule in this case means that, at the summary dismissal stage, the district court was
required to consider the claim as though Mr. Wagner was correct, and trial counsel told
him that he would be sentenced to a life term. That phrasing

··would be" - indicates

that the life term was more than a mere possibility, but rather, was definitely the
sentence that would have been imposed if he did not plead guilty.

Thus, by telling

Mr. Wagner he "would be" sentenced to a life term if he did not plead guilty, trial counsel
was promising a particular sentence would result from Mr. Wagner's choice on the plea
agreement.
When a promise that a particular sentence will result is made to the defendant
and that promise induces him to plead guilty, the defendant is entitled to relief.

See

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487, 493 C1962); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 256 (2012) (adopting the

rationale from Puckett and applying it to plea agreements and promises made therein).
Therefore, as in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner's affidavit created, at least, a genuine issue of
material fact that his attorney performed in an objectively unreasonable manner by
telling him that he "would be" sentenced to life in prison if he did not accept the plea
offer.

D.

Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That He Was Prejudiced
By Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance
Mr. Wagner also alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel's objectively

unreasonable performance.

Besides the manifest injustice and due process violation

caused by his plea being entered without the necessary voluntariness, see, e.g.,
Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, Mr. Wagner was also prejudiced because, but for counsel's
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advice about his potential trial, the potential sentence, and the offered plea deal, he
would have demanded a jury trial.

(R., p.74.)

He feit "duped" into pleading guilty.

(R., p.57.) That allegation estabiishes a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, Mr. Wagner would not have pleaded guilty when he did, but rather, would have
insisted on going to trial. Compare Booth v State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011 ). That
allegation is uncontradicted in the record. (See generally R.) Therefore, that allegation
in Mr. Wagner's affidavit is sufficient for Mr. Wagner's petition to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to the second prong of the Strickland test. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at
155 (holding that a defendant's affidavit alone is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact). Since he has aileged facts demonstrating objectively unreasonable
performance and prejudice, Mr. Wagner petition created at least one genuine issue of
material fact, and, therefore, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this matter.
The fact that there was evidence in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire
which potentially contradicted some of Mr. Wagner's allegations does not change the
conclusion that Mr. Wagner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Idaho Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that, at the summary dismissal stage of post conviction
proceedings, the district court is required to not just construe, but liberally construe, all
the inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 155 Idaho
345, 361 (2013); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321.
However, "the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008).
In this case, the district court misapplied this rule. It relied on evidence emerging
from Mr. Wagner's answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as the
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uncontroverted evidence from 111hich it could draw reasonable inferences to undermine
Mr. Wagner's claims. (R., pp.69-7·1.) However, Mr. Wagner challenged the reliability of
his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire by asserting in his affidavit that
he was trying to give the "correct" (as opposed to the "accurate") answers. (R., pp.7374.) Mr. Wagner alleged that the reason his answers were inaccurate was because, in
discussing the matter with counsel, counsel told him that if he did not give the "correct"
answer, his plea would be rejected. (R., p.74.) And, as the Idaho Supreme Court held
in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner's verified allegation of fact alone is sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact on that issue. See Baldwin, ·145 Idaho at 155. Therefore,
the evidence from the guilty plea coiloquy and questionnaire was disputed.
As a result, the district court was not free to draw any inference from that
evidence; it was required to construe it in the light most favorable to Mr. Wagner.

See, e.g., Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361. Furthermore, by using the disputed responses in
the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as a basis to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's
petition, the district court was essentially making a credibility determination that those
answers were more reliable than Mr. Wagner's statement under oath in his affidavit.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "judging credibility is not appropriate
during summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held."

Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 674 (2011 ). This rule holds true "even
when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations 'should not be made
on summary judgment .... "' Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho
411, 419 (2012) (quoting Argyle v. S/emaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Therefore, the district court's determination that, since it was the trier of fact, it could

25

make those determinations at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings (see
R., p. 71 ), was clearly wrong. 3 As a result, its reliance on the contested answers in the
plea colloquy and questionnaire as a viable basis to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's
petition was erroneous and should be reversed.
Applying the proper standards in this case, it is clear that Mr. Wagner's petition
sets forth a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance as Mr. Wagner decided whether to exercise his constitutional right
to a jury trial or to accept the pending plea offer, and so, rendered his plea not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Therefore, the decision to summarily dismiss

his petition was erroneous.

8

The district court's determination that Mr. Wagner presented no new evidence after
the district court entered is notice of intent to summarily dismiss the petition is also
clearly wrong because Mr. Wagner filed an affidavit making new or additional
allegations in support of his petition, including the allegation that the answers in the plea
colloquy and questionnaire were not accurate, after the notice of intent was filed.
(R., pp.64-72 (the notice of intent to summarily dismiss filed on July 31, 2013);
R., pp.73-74 (Mr. Wagner's affidavit filed on August 19, 2013).)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court grant the petition for rehearing,
witt1draw the Opinion in this case, and determine whether the district couri properly
summarily dismissed his petition for post conviction relief based on the grounds for
which he had appropriate notice and the opportunity to be heard.
On rehearing, Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order
summarily dismissing his petition, vacate the final judgment, and remand this case for
an evidentiary hearing because the facts, when liberally viewed in the light most
favorable to him, establish a genuine issue of material fact.
DATED this 2·1 st day of April, 2015.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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